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The Genesis of Capitalism: 
The Nexus between “Politics in Command” 
 and Social Engineering 
 
 
Li Xing and Jacques Hersh 
 
Introduction 
This paper aims to offer a framework of interpreting the “evolution” of 
capitalism that is reaching every corner of the world and has achieved greater 
legitimacy than at any time in human history. It covers an interdisciplinary 
discussion on the development of market capitalism that has been characterized 
by a dual process: unanticipated origin (cultural and historical) and anticipated 
progress (political economy).  
 
The point of departure of this paper is that although the advancement of market 
capitalism is a process of societal development involving historical, cultural and 
religious causes (historical, divine, spiritual, miraculous), the establishment of 
capitalism is less the result of a force for cultural and economic dynamism than 
the realization of a political project. In other words, from being an enterprise 
within defined geographical boundaries to becoming a global project is first and 
foremost a transformative process involving political repercussions as being 
dealt with here (enforced variation, reshaping, selection and distortion).  
 
In sum, the paper intends to problematize the significance of the evolutionary 
explanation, the culturalist approach as well as the economistic perspectives on 
the birth and expansion of capitalism and instead emphasizes the role of political 
power in its development and present-day stage. Politics to a great extent is 
undertakings of coercion, rationalization, legitimization and imposition which 
are the essence of market capitalism itself, i.e. politically motivated social 
engineering. 
 
Analytical considerations 
The axiom that the victor writes (his)story influences the conceptualization of 
contemporary capitalism. Seen in this light, the process of globalization (or 
Westernization as many also term it) affecting almost every aspect of human 
activity is taken as the logical outcome of the evolution of societal organization. 
 
The rational for this position is found in the econocentrism of the “secular mind” 
(Coles, 1999), which sees modernity as the culmination of economic rationality, 
progressive spirituality and the faith of modernization. Through this prism, it is 
believed that humanity has entered the ultimate phase of its evolution, as 
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expressed in the thesis on “the end of history” (Fukuyama, 1992). But as 
Anthony Giddens has put it “rather than entering a period of post-modernism, 
we are moving into one in which the consequences of modernity are becoming 
more radicalized and universalized than before” (1991:3). 
 
In its endeavor to ascribe legitimacy to the social order of “real existing” 
capitalism, conventional thinking relies on neoliberalism which has become the 
dominant paradigm of economics. Its ideological foundations are found in the 
social and political philosophy of emerging capitalism based on the concept of 
individual freedom and democracy. Causes, which emanated in the struggle 
against the feudal order. 
 
Acceptance of globalization as the child of historical capitalism opens for a 
problematization of the past in order to understand the present and reflect on the 
future. However, just as conceptualizing the present understanding the history of 
capitalism is an arena of conflict within the social sciences. In its long march 
towards achieving hegemony, the capitalist worldview was constantly resisted 
by another approach which challenged it ideological and politically. Awareness 
of this confrontation contributes to making sense of a historical process, which 
would otherwise be at the mercy of the system’s proponents’ interpretation. In 
the words of Samir Amin: 
 
As far as modern history is concerned, that of capitalism, two 
discourses have been in opposition to each other in the past two 
centuries; and never could the one convince the adherents of the other. 
There is on the one hand the conservative discourse, which legitimizes 
the capitalist social order, and on the other hand, there is the socialist 
discourse, which submits it to a radical critique (Amin, 1997:10). 
 
The point, which deserves transparency in dealing with social theoretical 
constructions, is that they do not operate in politico-ideological vacuums. Given 
the societal context in which they operate, they come to serve the aims of special 
interest groups, which find it worthwhile to support and encourage the one 
against the other. As Robert Cox doesn’t tire in telling us: “Theory is always for 
someone and for some purpose. We need to know the context in which theory is 
produced and used; and we need to know whether the aim of the user is to 
maintain the existing social order or to change it” (Cox, 1995:31) 
 
The arena of contest between different ideological/scientific paradigms is 
located of course within the confines of the power structure of societies. This 
explains that while capitalist economic theory found it difficult to penetrate the 
realm of state socialism, socialist critique of capitalism likewise was put at a 
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disadvantage as a result of the hegemony of liberalism in the “free world”. 
 
In capitalist society – which is the focus of this paper - social conflicts of one or 
another kind are always present. Under those circumstances one aspect of power 
relations is the ability to control the agenda of confrontation (Bachrach and 
Baratz, 1962). A good example of this is the fact that in the United States the 
struggle over the ownership of the means of production has almost always been 
kept out of the public agenda (Ross and Frachte, 1990: 9). 
 
Thus not only is power reflected in the ability to prevail in conflict, it is also the 
capacity to determine the conceptualization of the issues involved. In this 
context socialization and social control play an important role in stratified 
societies. The secret charm of dominant power under such circumstances is 
attained if it can be dispensed in a consensual frame. As Ross and Frachte put it: 
 
The hegemony of capitalist culture and the perceived realities of 
political choice are such that the given structure of choice appears to 
be rational, inevitable, “natural”. There is often no “politics”, that is, 
no large scale conflict or explicit contention about this structure of 
choice, because it has been accepted by potentially contending parties 
before public agendas are constructed” (ibid.:9). 
 
It is within this critical frame of reference that this article discusses the genesis 
of global capitalism by critically focusing on the conventional reading of the 
emergence and development process of this social formation. 
 
Objective: understanding the evolution of capitalism 
For the last two centuries, scholars and researchers have attempted to find 
answers to questions such as “Why did capitalism evolve in medieval Europe 
and not in China, India or anywhere else?” and “what were the necessary 
building blocks of capitalism?” and “what makes this economic system such a 
powerful global project?” Different explanations have been offered putting 
emphasis on different historical, cultural and social factors or aspects.  
 
The conventional framework for understanding and interpreting these elements 
and their causal correlations is found in the discussion of how economic and 
cultural processes interact to shape and reshape the socio-economic environment 
in the evolution of market capitalism. In this context, the point of departure of 
this paper is the assumption that although the advancement of market capitalism 
is a historical societal process including cultural and religious dimensions 
(historical, divine, spiritual, miraculous), the establishment of capitalism is less 
the result of cultural and economic dynamism than the outcome of a political 
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project. In other words, market capitalism is first and foremost a coercive 
political enterprise process with societal repercussion (enforced variation, 
reshaping, selection and distortion). Viewed in this light, we need to realize that 
we are dealing with a rationalizing, legitimizing and imposing political 
undertaking, which is fundamentally at the heart of market capitalism. Given 
this background, the study of capitalism becomes the principal objective of 
political economy. 
 
Market capitalism: the new secular religion 
In the evolution of mankind, worship of a god was in many societies the point of 
reference for the construction of reality on which individuals’ worldview was 
conceptualized. Religion as a belief system constituted not only the ideological 
cement of society, but the only way of comprehending the world. The 
conceptualization system of society offered little apart from reflection on the 
religious view of the cosmos. With the advancement of societal evolution 
following the development of science and technology, human society 
experienced recurring paradigm shifts during various periods of history, which 
in turn gave rise to different types of social theories. In other words, new 
material conditions and political institutions demanded different systems of 
thought and explanations.  
 
Serving as a scientific explanation system the free market has become the central 
category and the core of the discipline of economics. As Blaug points out: “The 
history of economic thought ... is nothing but the history of our efforts to 
understand the workings of an economy based on market transactions” (1985:6). 
Accordingly conventional economics can be seen as the theoretical construction 
of capitalism. Rule also emphasizes the importance that the phenomenon plays 
in the modern mindset, “When historians of ideas go to work on the last decade 
of the twentieth century, the market will surely appear as one of our intellectual 
totems. What the Rights of Man were to the French Revolution – or what 
Manifest Destiny or the quest for the Kingdom of God on Earth were to their 
times – the market is to our own” (1998:29). Nevertheless, it must not be 
forgotten that economics as an independent discipline is a relatively modern 
phenomenon, and that until the mid-1700s “economics was generally discussed 
as a subordinate part of a broader study of political, moral and theological 
matters” (Alvey, 1999:55). 
 
The consequence of this tour de force, which reduces all aspects of society to 
economic calculations, is a proto-type of ideological “soft totalitarianism.” As a 
student of this evolution puts it: “Apart from presenting the ‘economic’ as its 
own sphere, removed from the reaches of democratic control, the politics of 
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economism also tends to subordinate other social spheres to its normative 
supremacy” (Teivainen, 2002:2). 
 
The deification of the market 
The 20th century is often described as the “American Century”. With 
globalization, the American Creed, which embraces worship of free markets, 
free elections, individual freedom and rights, liberal democracy, has become 
canonized. This gospel appears to have achieved the status of a world religion. 
To most people in the United States, market capitalism is ideologically speaking 
becoming a kind of orthodoxy. That capitalism is the only way leading to 
happiness and well-being is taken as an article of faith. Any questioning of these 
basic tenets is considered to be heretical and the skeptics risk marginalization by 
mainstream opinion. Liberal economics has become theology. Even religion in 
today’s US is so commercialized that “God is for sale”, thus becoming a 
material and commodity for competition and consumption (Moore, 1994). 
 
In the process of having achieved a hegemonic position within economics, 
operations and interactions within the market are construed as value-free and 
neutral objective, implicitly suggesting that like God the market cannot be 
judged normatively. In the view of the Central American Jesuit theologian and 
philosopher Franz Hinkelammert, the market is raised to a holy status level so 
that it can “judge over life and death but cannot itself be judged in terms of the 
effect it has on the life and death of every individual” (quoted in George and 
Sabelli (1994:96)). Harvey Cox observes that, in many ways there is a strong 
resemblance between the Western theological doctrines of religion and the 
modern market ideology in which the almighty market has become godlike 
(Cox, 1999:20-22). 
 
Firstly, like God the market is attributed omnipotence (ultimate universal 
power). In the ancient era, the market was never godlike or the only deity 
because there were other centers of value and meaning. It is only in the last two 
centuries that the market has become transformed into the dominant divinity. 
Now, the market defines truth and possesses the divine power to “make 
something out of nothing and nothing out of something”, such as converting 
earth and land to real estate, and human body to commodities (Cox, ibid.:20). 
 
Secondly, like God the market is considered to be equipped by nature with 
omniscience (all knowledge and the truth). Human beings have to understand the 
market’s wisdom which will, in return, shape our needs, determine whether, 
when, where, how to buy and sell. The market knows “the deepest secrets and 
darkest desires of our heart” and “… by probing our inmost fears and desires 
and then dispensing across-the-board solutions, it can further extend its reach.” 
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Thus, “… to question the omniscience of The Market is to question the 
inscrutable wisdom of Providence” (Cox, ibid.:22). 
 
Thirdly, like God the market is ascribed the power of omnipresence (universal 
existence, everywhere regardless of whether one can see it or not). 
Consequently, the market is supposed to have everything to do with economics 
and societal development, and it is also believed to have close influence on 
every aspect of human life: 
 
… The Market is not only around us but inside us, informing our 
senses and our feelings. There seems to be nowhere left to flee from 
its untiring quest. Like the Hound of Heaven, it pursues us home from 
the mall and into the nursery and the bedroom (Cox, ibid.:23). 
      
The market’s mode of functioning is raised to the standing of a natural law. In 
the words of a Protestant thinker, “The laws of the market … come to be seen as 
transcendent, [undergoing] a process of sociological sacralization. Not only are 
they given a higher status, they actually become untouchable, like the laws of 
nature” (cf. George and Sabelli, 1994:96-97). The contemporary doctrine of 
“market populism” – the presumption that the market and democracy are the two 
sides of the same coin, and that the market represents not only mediums of 
exchange but also mediums of consent – has become the pivotal ideology of our 
time (Frank, 2001). In this way, the “invisible hand” of the market is like the 
hand of God holding the final truth of all interactions and phenomena. 
 
As a consequence, economics implicitly becomes theological doxy and a science 
– an organized system of explanations to make sense of the real world and life. 
Within this type of explanatory catechism, there are a number of doctrinal 
principles which are taken as guidelines for human behavior and societal 
development:  
 
1) The market is the invisible hand representing absolute and universal rules 
and laws. And in this sense, the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO are 
the legislating bodies of market laws on behalf of the highest authority: 
the dismantling of mandatory planning, the opening up of the economy to 
international competition, the implementation of financial liquidation and 
bankruptcy, the introduction of bonds, shares, and stock market for 
primary and secondary trading, the acceptance of international 
competition and integration with foreign trade and financial transactions, 
the privatization of state-owned companies, the diversification of 
ownership forms (private, joint-venture, state, and foreign), greater 
flexibility and mobility of labor and population, free prices, the removal 
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of subsidies, closing ‘inefficient’ enterprises and the laying-off of 
redundant workers. 
 
2) Market rules and laws are inalterable like those of nature. Those who 
obey the principles will be awarded, and those who defy them, such as 
Soviet socialism, Asia’s “crony capitalism”, Russian “mafia capitalism” 
as well as other types of statist capitalism, will be considered abhorrent 
and thus sooner or later will be punished.  
 
3) In order for developing and transitional societies to ensure that these 
fundamental principles are accepted and maintained, certain sacrifices and 
painful reforms or adjustments, such as “shock therapy” and various 
structural adjustment programmes, etc., are deemed to be necessary. 
 
4) Regardless of the fact that inequalities and crises in many parts of the 
world may seem to contradict the ideals of market rules and laws, it is 
believed that these flaws including poverty, environmental pollutions and 
ecological degradations, can be corrected in the long run without 
abandoning market fundamentals. 
 
5) Those who challenge such principles and attempt to find alternatives, such 
as statism or other forms of communitarianism, are seen as challenging 
the only viable political and economic system conducive to human 
happiness and prosperity. As a consequence of the defeat of state 
socialism and the spread of liberalism and market capitalism, humanity is 
claimed to have arrived at the “end of history” (Fukuyama, 1992). 
 
Market capitalism and civilization specificities  
Whether market capitalism is the natural outcome of human civilizations or not 
is an essential issue. The answer to this question is determinant to the 
understanding of present-day contradictions in the world. It is argued here that 
the free market, as an exchange instrument is the product generated by a specific 
development process within specific geographic areas. In other words, it can be 
conceptualized as a socio-cultural entity. To say that the free market is a socio-
cultural institution is to suggest that the way people interact in the exchange 
process (regulating and coordinating their economic behaviors) shapes people’s 
identity and behavior. 
 
According to Wilk’s studies on the relationship between economy and culture 
(see Acheson 1997: 233-234), economic anthropology has shown that economic 
arrangements are based on one of three assumptions about human nature. The 
first regards humans as economic beings who are motivated by self-interest and 
7 
  
 
who are strongly associated with the free market where autonomous profit-
seeking individuals interact with one another without much concern to ties of 
kinship or community. The second sees humans as social beings whose 
behaviors are molded in association within groups. Several approaches of 
political economy including Marxism are related to this interpretation. The third 
believes that humans are moral or ethical beings whose worldview is shaped by 
a set of values. This is what Wilk identifies as “cultural economics.” 
 
Max Weber can be identified as related to the last supposition. In his Economy 
and Society (1921) he analyses the main aspects of economic rationality in a 
capitalist society in the West and contrasts them with economic orientations in 
other types of society. These characteristics of rationality find their expression 
in: market exchange, where transactions are determined only by the pursuit of 
interests; generalized use of money as means of rational capital accounting; the 
rational management of labor in production and strict factory discipline; rational 
technology; clear separation of the enterprise from the household. Moreover, 
these economic features are assisted by extra-economic public goods, such as 
the functioning of government administration and the legal system, which 
guarantee the reliability of all contracts entered in the market. 
 
Weber argued that a unique causal connection existed between the spiritual and 
the temporal, namely the effect of religion (Lutheranism and Calvinism) on the 
development of capitalism especially in terms of: 1) rationalization and 
creativity of economic activities; 2) organization of political and social life; 3) 
rational organization of free labor (separation of productive activity from the 
household); 4) modern book-keeping system; and 5) industrial organization. 
These characteristics are depicted as unique cultural phenomena of Western 
civilization and as the elements behind the emergence of capitalism in Europe. 
The conclusion that follows from this conceptualization is that the lack of the 
same distinctive traits explains why capitalism failed to emerge in other 
historically advanced civilizations such as China and India. 
 
Social scientists have since Weber debated in a manner of either agreeing or 
disagreeing with him. In similarity with the Weberian conceptualization but in a 
developmental context, some scholars, such as de Soto (2000), take up the 
question, which many people have been asking and studying and which is one of 
the most debated issues the world faces today: Why do some countries succeed 
in developing capitalism while others fail? As an institutionalist economist, de 
Soto attempts to show that historically speaking every developed nation in the 
world at one time went through the transformation process from predominantly 
informal, extra-legal ownership forms to a formal, codified property law system 
in which people are allowed to leverage property into wealth. In line with this 
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type of thinking, it is therefore not because of the lack of salable assets or the 
shortage of entrepreneurial spirit, but the lack of institutionalization that some 
countries fail to make capitalism flourish. This approach’s shortcoming is that 
evidence shows that the establishment of a capitalist-friendly legal infrastructure 
cannot be realized outside the compatible environment of cultural values and 
social norms. In addition, it should not be ignored that many developing 
countries were/are actually burdened by political turmoil and social unrest due to 
the privatization process of the structural transformation of property relations 
imposed by Western-oriented economic development and expropriation of parts 
of the economic surplus through the debt servicing. 
 
It is argued by some Weberians that the rise of market capitalism was an 
outcome of a peculiar institutional development, which found its clearest 
expression in the capitalist economy. This evolution refers to the nuclear core of 
social and cultural institutions, the historical role of a particular family type - 
individualistic bourgeois family with its social habits and norms; this is claimed 
to be “the only institution sufficiently dynamic to spontaneously engender social 
processes that made for both the development of a modern market economy and 
the rise of civil society during the 18th and 19th centuries in the northwestern part 
of Europe” (Berger, 1998: 45). Furthermore, it is perceived to be “the core 
features of any social order based on the principles of individual liberty, political 
democracy, and a market economy” (ibid.: 45). During the societal transition 
from family to factory production, the division of labor increased and economic 
activities based on the family also moved to the firm. Likewise, with the 
emergence of a formal education system, education and training functions 
previously provided by the family and church were replaced by a specialized 
institution - the school.  
In the middle of the 18th century, the European feudal era was in a gradual 
process of eroding. The old social and political order, in which the elites 
including monarchies, the Church, the land-aristocracies as well as the 
bourgeoisies formed the ruling coalition in the appropriation of the lion’s share 
of the economic surplus, began to waver. The emerging wealthy business 
sectors, being tired of resisting the older political hierarchies, opted for 
republican state-forms as a better political environment for the further 
development of their economic activities. However, they also understood that 
the only way to lead society on the road to capitalism was to gain access to 
political power. Therefore, they took the advantage of the people’s discontent by 
promising a democratic republic under the spirit and principle of liberty, 
equality, fraternity as well as offering popular participation in the new regime. 
The “people power”, first in France and later in the United States, overthrew the 
old regimes. In the course of the two centuries since, the discourse of freedom, 
rights, liberty, equality and fraternity has been associated with capitalism.  
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Western secularization in historical perspectives 
The breaking-up of the old order resulted in the dissolution of the political and 
spiritual dominance of nobility and Church. The concept of “secularization” 
entailed a long historical evolution and societal development characterized by 
intense conflicts, struggles, transformations, and changes which accompanied 
the process whereby religious ideas and teachings came to be considered as 
having no inherent value to society and development. It also has come to imply a 
sense of triumphalism, a pervasive assertiveness of modern Western civilization, 
which seeks to establish its cultural values as having universal validity regarding 
the past, present, and future. Less optimistic is the thesis of cultural clash, which 
projected to be the profound source of potential conflicts between the West and 
the rest since the systemic contest with socialism has been resolved in favor of 
capitalism (Huntington, 1996). 
 
Historical perspectives  
The gradual development of modern secular society in the West led to the 
separation of Church from the state (or politics). Religion has been transformed 
in such a manner as to become a matter of personal preference for each 
individual. Furthermore, it is generally accepted that the Church should have no 
role to play within the affairs of the state or the society at large. In secular 
society the role of religion is seen as subservient to the interests of the state. This 
is the common understanding of a modern society in today’s world. Secularism 
has reached its strongest manifestation in the West, which historically forced 
most other nations to adopt this course either through military and economic 
means, or through cultural and educational influences. This notwithstanding, the 
entire phase of colonization and colonialism was based on the messianic pillar of 
bringing Christianity to the non-European people of Africa, Asia and South 
America. 
 
In the Middle Ages, Europe was ruled by a feudal system upheld by the 
Monarch, Nobility and the Church. The principle of religious philosophy that 
man’s life was predestined by God helped feudalism to maintain the status quo 
and oppression over society. Dissident humanist philosophies were suppressed 
by the power of the Church. Those who defied the prevailing religious dogmas 
were banished, tortured or executed. The term “Middle Ages” was often used 
synonymously with the “Dark Ages” as Europe was in the darkest period of its 
history. 
 
The feudal system began to collapse due to a number of parallel developments 
and challenges causing the gradual marginalization of the Church. The first was 
the revolution in science (Hall, 1983), which started to play an important role in 
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Europe and lead to the confrontation with the teachings of the Church. The law 
of gravity, the revolution in astronomy, the innovation in biology etc, 
represented challenges to the existing fundamental assumptions leading to what 
Thomas Kuhn (1970) referred to as changes of paradigms.1
 
The second ideological challenge was the Renaissance and intellectual 
libertarianism, which found expression in the flourishing of art, music, literature, 
philosophy and exploration, as well as the attacks on the dominance of religion 
and the belief system based on superstition. Humanism in the West denoted a 
break with religious mysticism; thereby drawing a distinction between God and 
man believing that man was born to be free and human existence should not be 
predetermined by God. These teachings are now widely regarded as the 
philosophical sources of Western human rights and democracy.  
 
The third challenge to the established structures of feudalism and emerging 
agrarian capitalism was the Industrial Revolution, which transformed Europe 
(first England and the Netherlands2) into manufacturing capitalism much earlier 
than the rest of the world and which provided Europe with powerful weapons 
for imperial expansion and colonization supplanting the earlier mercantilistic 
phase. In the view of the functional approach, this forceful development 
transformed society from “a holistic traditional life form permeated by religion 
toward a steadily increased differentiation of social functions leading to the 
marginalization and even obsolescence of religion” (Dallmayr, 1999:718, italic 
added). This transformation also developed newer social categories and relations 
- industrialists and workers - in the emergence of the nation-state. The final 
establishment of the capitalist system in Europe as manifested by commercial 
interests, free trade, market expansion and profit-earning, marked the end of the 
dominance of the old system leading to the rise of new centers of power.  
 
The marginalization of the dogma and role of religion in Europe represented a 
process of ideological transformation from the “age of faith” (Church-State) to 
the “age of reason” (nation-state). Faith is the strongest indication of belief in 
truth even in the absence of any objective fact or in opposition to observable 
evidence. The age of reason indicates that truth can solely be obtained by a 
process of rational and logical thinking, which is based on the evidence provided 
by the senses.  
 
Capitalism and religious reformation/deformation  
In addition to the above-mentioned historical influences on the evolution of 
secularism in the West, another explanation, which may have facilitated its 
emergence in Europe, was that, although many political ideological systems were 
generated by Western civilization, the West has not given birth to any native-
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born religion. As Huntington notes,  
 
The great political ideologies of the twentieth century include 
liberalism, socialism, anarchism, corporatism, Marxism, communism, 
social democracy, conservatism, nationalism, fascism, and Christian 
democracy. They all share one thing in common: they are products of 
Western civilization. No other civilization has generated a significant 
political ideology. The West, however, has never generated a major 
religion. The great religions of the world are all products of non-
Western civilizations and, in most cases, antedate Western civilization 
(Huntington, 1996:53-54). 
 
It can be deduced from this recognition that since Christianity was not of 
Western origin, the possibilities of reformation3 within the Christian religion 
could not but result in a deformed belief system, i.e. the Protestant deformation 
(Kurth, 1998). Deformation implies a process of reshaping, changing and finally 
transforming the original ideas into a modified moral and ethical system. It 
marked the beginning of Protestantism, and represented a major break in the 
theological dogma of Christianity. Far from being marginalized, religion was 
seen as a pioneer of capitalist behavior. 
 
The cultural and religious uniqueness of the West 
Max Weber is known for his writings on the rise of capitalism in the West from 
the perspectives of culture and religion. He theorized the deformation process 
(i.e. “rationalization process”) – as the outcome of the relationship between 
Protestantism, especially Calvinism, and the rise of capitalism in the West. His 
thesis was that religion (Protestantism) played a positive role in the rapid 
development of capitalism in Europe.  
 
According to this interpretation of the rise of modern capitalism, religious 
(Calvinist) spirituality was secularized when the dedication to the task of 
societal regeneration became linked to the generalization and multiplication of 
capital and when profit making was turned into an ethos, a moral crusade.4 
Weber’s thesis is explained by David Loy as follows: 
 
Calvinist belief in predestination encouraged what became an 
irresistible need to determine whether one was among the chosen; 
economic success in this world came to be accepted as demonstrating 
God's favor; this created the psychological and sociological conditions 
for importing ascetic values from the monastery into worldly 
vocations, as one labored to prove oneself saved by reinvesting any 
surplus rather than consuming it (Loy, 1997). 
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Accordingly, this gave birth to a socio-economic evolution which began to 
function in a manner independent of religion while the latter was compelled to 
comply with the economic logic. As Marx vividly remarked, “The English 
Established Church, e.g., will more readily pardon an attack on 38 of its 39 
articles than on 1/39 of its income” (Marx, 1977:10). That is to say, the original 
motivation behind “capitalist spirituality” gradually became irrelevant with 
maturing capitalism. When the preoccupation with market, capital and profit 
develops into the engine of economic growth, it has not only survived but has 
also become the core of modern economics as the only rational and scientific 
explanatory system.  
 
Historically, the Protestant tradition rejected hierarchy and community as means to 
salvation. Protestantism was “a protest against the form that the Christian 
religion had taken in the Roman Catholicism of the late Middle Ages and 
Renaissance.” (Kurth, 1998:224) In the economic sphere, the common 
characteristic of Protestant entrepreneurs was that their “religious feeling was 
often intense but essentially private and personal” with a desire “to be left alone 
by religious enthusiasts and organizers and to escape from the clericalist and 
cannon-law network” (Johnson, 1993:34). In fact, many tended to emigrate to 
places where religious rules were relaxed and where they could develop their 
innovative energies and capabilities5. The religious dimension in history of 
capitalism in the United States is often used as a case in point to support this 
type of explanation. Even today, the clue of American economic superiority over 
that of Europe is argued to be found in the “God factor”, i.e. the pious, 
industrious and hard-working United States that was born from and has kept the 
Protestant spirit of capitalism is said to be in clear contrast to the decline and fall 
of the spirit of Christian asceticism in Europe, which manifests itself in 
decreasing working hours, increasing strikes, declining church attendance and 
believing less in God (Ferguson, 2003). 
 
Besides Weber, Hegel and Marx also accepted the aspects of the culturalist 
explanation as to why Occidental (Western) societies were able to achieve 
industrialization earlier than the rest of the world, and why the Oriental (Asian) 
societies failed to do so.6 Their explanations were based on the perceptions that 
traditional religions (inward, static), cultures (Confucianism, communal and 
collective) and social/political patterns (bureaucratic, absolutist) in oriental 
societies were structural barriers inimical to the development of capitalism 
whose dynamism requires innovation, incentives, self-interest and 
individualism. This also denotes the recognition that modernization is 
preconditioned on cultural capital and ideological attitudes, which must be 
receptive to capitalism.  
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Given this ascription to the importance of capitalism’s cultural precondition, it is 
not surprising that this line of thinking achieved paradigmatic preeminence 
within the most dominant development theory, i.e. the modernization school, 
which has exerted great influence on policy-making in the context of the Third 
World. Since the Second World War, the dichotomy of tradition-modernity has 
received more than its share of attention. As spelt out by Sadie, development 
denotes a complete cultural transformation: 
 
Economic development of an underdeveloped people by themselves is 
not compatible with the maintenance of their traditional customs and 
mores. A break with the latter is a prerequisite to economic progress. 
What is needed is a revolution in the totality of social, cultural and 
religious institutions and habits, and thus in their psychological 
attitude, their philosophy and way of life. What is, therefore, required 
amounts in reality to social disorganization. Unhappiness and 
discontentment in the sense of wanting more than is obtainable at any 
moment is to be generated” (1960:302). 
 
The disembodiment of modern society from its traditional context can 
paradoxically be noted in the transformation of modern capitalism, which now 
“stands in opposition to Calvinism and to religion in general.” The reason for 
that transformation is that the dominant market economy has become an entity 
that combines norms, values, markets, money, and laws as an unanticipated 
consequence of the Protestant ethic because “people create social structures but 
that those structures soon take on a life of their own, over which the creators 
have little or no control. Because people lack control over them, structures are 
free to develop in a variety of totally unanticipated directions” (Ritzer, 
1996:149). In other words, the derivations of Protestantism in the rise of 
capitalism were later transformed into a unique deformed capitalist system of its 
own which is what we are experiencing today. 
 
In line with this interpretation, modern secular politics can be viewed as an 
unanticipated consequence of the market mechanism determined by the inherent 
profit-making logic of capitalism. Not only nation-states but the entire system of 
international relations are directly or indirectly connected with this outcome. 
Politics in the West, whether domestic or international, is generally perceived in 
terms of power, government, national interest and patriotism, and are often 
associated with political parties, division and balance of power, and mutual 
checks. All of these have no foundation in the original Christian principles.  
 
The central theme I: an anticipated deformation  
While many scholars agree with the Weberian notion that market capitalism 
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developed as a historically and culturally specific socio-economic formation in 
which religious ethics played a certain role in its origin, others such as Karl 
Polanyi disagree with the culturalist thesis of modern capitalism as an 
unanticipated consequence of religious ethics. Whether the transformation from 
religious deformation was marked by an unwillingness to adhere to any 
particular doctrine or by the antagonism of strictly institutionalized and 
clericalized Christianity towards the progressive elements identified with the 
capitalist system is an anticipated or unanticipated process is an issue of debate. 
The following two sections of this paper highlight a critical discussion of 
classical economics and Weberian culturalism as well as to bringing into light 
our views on the role of politics in the genesis of capitalism. 
 
The political economy of transformation and catching-up 
The transformation of the market place as an institution of exchange into a 
market system of capital accumulation is what distinguishes capitalism form 
pre-capitalist societies. The history of the market can be said to reach back 
several thousands of years to the post-neolithic times according to two German 
political economists who point out that the specific integration of different 
economic elements in this system – the “market economization” 
(Vermarktwirtschaftung) of land, natural resources, labour power, and money – 
is of later date. Only since the Industrial Revolution can we speak of the “market 
economy” as a totality (Altvater and Mahnkopf, 1997). 
 
According to economic anthropology, the modern capitalist mode of production 
differentiates itself from all preceding ways of organizing material life and 
social reproduction. It is distinctive in the way that economic relations (actors 
and institutions) are separated from non-economic relations – a distinction 
between a society with market and a market society (Polanyi, 1957). A market 
society implies that society itself has become an “adjunct” of the market. And a 
market economy can exist only in a market society because social relations in 
such a society are embedded in the economy rather than the other way around – 
i.e. an economy embedded in social relations (Wood, 1999).  
 
The importance of this argumentation – which goes against the classical and 
liberal orthodoxy - is that the market as such is not a natural phenomenon; nor is 
it a reflection of human nature. It emerged neither from the spontaneous 
interaction of autonomous individuals, nor as an unanticipated consequence of 
Protestant ethics. Although Polanyi recognized the existence of unintended 
consequences in social life, he strongly believed that economic and trade 
relations necessitated centrally organized and controlled interventionism: 
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There was nothing natural about laissez-faire; free markets could 
never have come into being merely by allowing things to take their 
course. ... Laissez-faire itself was enforced by the state. The [1830s 
and 1840s] saw not only an outburst of legislation repealing restrictive 
regulations, but also an enormous increase in the administrational 
bureaucracy able to fulfill the tasks set by the adherents of liberalism. 
... Laissez-faire was not a method to achieve a thing; it was the thing 
to be achieved (Polanyi, [1944] 1957: 139). 
 
During the period 1830 to 1850 in Britain, the enhancement of the state’s 
administrative functions in the form of bureaucratic control was highly needed 
to manage the complexity of the countless laws passed to dismantle the 
traditional agricultural system and to pave the way for rapidly developing 
industrial capitalism. In other words, the implementation of state regulation and 
intervention was a precondition for laissez-faire to mushroom. 
 
The societal implication is that market dominance is inseparable from political 
instrumentality as well as a conscious design. Self-regulating laissez-faire 
requires strong “support” from the state: 
 
While on the one hand markets spread all over the face of the globe 
and the amount of goods involved grew to unbelievable proportions, 
on the other hand a network of measures and policies was integrated 
into powerful institutions designed to check the action of the market 
relative to labor, land, and money (Polanyi [1944] 1957: 76). 
 
The same applies to the forces at work in the world economy. Putting “politics 
in command” was not only a precondition for socialist construction as Mao put 
it, but was/is a prerequisite for market capitalism. In more contemporary times, 
the rise of American global economic power especially with regard to its boom 
in the 1990s had less to do with market mechanisms than with deliberate 
political interventions. Key macroeconomic relationships between the American 
economy and the international political economy came about through constant 
US interventions in restructuring the global market through the exercise of 
statecraft in a number of areas in order to favor its own economic interest. This 
explains the manipulation of dollar politics (exchange and interest rates), the 
imposition of the free movement of finance, the compulsory end of capital 
control in the rest of the world, beneficial terms of trade with the South, and the 
military control of the sources and supply of energy and raw materials (Gowan, 
2001). 
 
In the current era of global capitalism, Polanyi’s analysis deserves to be taken 
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seriously into consideration. The evolution of globalization cuts across different 
political coalitions, national bureaucracies and other domestic social institutions 
to ‘peg’ the state to market interests with the result that important decisions are 
made by corporate financial centers in North America and Western Europe. As 
Boyer and Drache point out,  
 
In the 1990s, governments on both the right and left approach policy-
making as a spectacular casino where everybody is trying to guess the 
next move of the Bundesbank, the results of the next election in 
Canada, Germany, the UK or France or the forthcoming statement by 
President Clinton on interest rates (1996: 19).  
 
The “invisible hand” of the market wears a political glove. It has long been held 
that corporate elites are just “a functional group that reproduces itself, by 
following the scientific laws of economics and respecting ‘good governance’”, 
but what is often neglected in this view is the hidden political implications that 
“Corporate leaders of today are involved in politics. Even if the economy 
remains determinant, politics decides” (Joxe, 2002: 155).  
 
In the uneven historical development of capitalism, on which classical 
economists had little to say, economic nationalism offered an interpretation of 
international political economy, which not only recognized the imperative of 
statism in the promotion of industrialization strategy. The prominent political 
economist, Friedrich List (1789-1846), concluded from the economic history of 
the industrial process of Western nations such as England that there had never 
been such a phenomenon as unintended industrialization, free competition, or 
free international trade. Rather, the English example showed the opposite – the 
intended trade and market expansion backed by designed protectionism of 
national economies and by military force if necessary: 
 
Had they (the Britain) sanctioned the free importation into England of 
Indian cotton and silk goods, the English cotton and silk 
manufactories must of necessity soon come to a stand. India had not 
only the advantage of cheaper labor and raw material, but also the 
experience, the skill, and the practice of centuries. The effect of these 
advantages could not fail to tell under a system of free competition…. 
Accordingly, England prohibited the import of the goods dealt in by 
her own factories, the Indian cotton and silk fabrics. The prohibition 
was complete and peremptory ([1885]1991: 42-43). 
 
As a consequence of British industrialization strategy, the industrial revolution 
of India was sabotaged. In the chapter called The Theory of the Powers of 
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Production, List argues that when two different countries characterized by 
unequal development levels maintain free trade between them, the result is that 
the one selling manufactured goods would be supreme while the other selling 
raw and agricultural products would be subservient. Only after years of 
protectionism, violence and imperial power, during which Britain became far 
ahead of any competitor, did it adopt the principles of free market with 
nevertheless deep reservations. Forty percent of British textiles constituted 
exports to India and the steel markets in the colonies were always available 
when the British steel price was less competitive on international markets 
(Chomsky, 1997).  
 
While the Listian approach, defined as traditional economic nationalism, proved 
successful in the industrialization of Germany, Japan and even the United States 
which refused premature free trade and favored mercantilist state protection to 
promote manufacturing industries. In a similar way, the success of the East 
Asian newly industrializing countries in the last century was based on a path, 
which could be called neo-Listian. From this angle, the strategic role of the state 
encompassed the neutralizing of domestic and external forces and harnessing 
them to the national project was the objective of the “developmentalist state” 
(Hoogvelt, 1997: 205-206). In the latter case, however, it should not be ignored 
that post-World War II geopolitics played a determining role in East Asia where 
the United States allowed non-liberal economies to emerge (Hersh, 1993 and Li, 
et al. 2002). 
 
The “invisible hand” versus moral economics 
It is generally recognized that what we know today about neoclassical 
economics is primarily derived from Adam Smith, whose book The Wealth of 
Nations (1776) is generally considered to be the intellectual underpinning for the 
discipline of economics. He is seen as the father of market capitalism who 
sketched the theory of general equilibrium whereby the pursuit of private gain 
can be socially productive under conditions of free competition. He is especially 
remembered for the notion of the invisible hand and the equilibrium thesis - the 
idea that the market’s competitive dynamic based on self-interest turns 
individual behavior into the most efficient use of resources and socially 
desirable outcomes.  
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While the “invisible hand” has become the guiding concept for neoclassical 
economists, it is forgotten that Smith was also professor of moral philosophy at 
Glasgow University whose publications included The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1759), which presented his views on human motivation and moral 
behavior. The very first paragraph of this book could be taken as evidence of a 
sensitivity to social relations: 
 
How selfish so ever man may be supposed, there are evidently some 
principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, 
and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives 
nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or 
compassion, the emotion, which we feel for the misery of others, when 
we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. 
That we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others is a matter of 
fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, 
like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means 
confined to the virtuous and humane, though they perhaps may feel it 
with the most exquisite sensibility (Smith [1759] 2002: 11). 
 
Is it reasonable to ascribe the interpretation that what Adam Smith wanted to 
bring together was the Christian ethics of “Moral Sentiments” with the 
acquisitive assumption of capitalist behavior of the “Wealth of Nations”? That is 
a combination of the individual premise of his economics with the decency of 
conduct under girding social, political and economic activities, private and 
public. His concept of economics as a moral science, in the view of Young 
(1997), shows that a close relationship exists between Simth’s ethical 
philosophy and economics – each developing in relation to the other. 
 
However, a more critical evaluation of Adam Smith’s contribution maintains 
that after having written his volume on morality (1759), his magnum opus 
(1776) – which only became influential a generation later - became useful to 
pro-capitalist forces promoting their political project with little regard to issues 
of morality (Perelman, 2000: 8). In the words of a critique: “It took a professor 
of ethics to prise the science of economics from the clutches of ethics – to 
exclude ethics from the explanation of the economic process (Buarque, 1993: 
12). 
 
For centuries, advocates of capitalism have treated Smith’s equilibrium theory7 
much as they have treated market theory more generally. In the view of some 
scholars, Smith’s ideas are distorted by self-serving corporate capitalists who 
selectively choose those elements of his thinking that support their objective. 
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Schlefer (1998) argues that Adam Smith has often been misquoted and distorted 
in economic literature to such an extent that he is made to say things he did not 
mean. Others (Fitzgibbons, 1995; Korten, 1995) maintain that Smith has been 
misconstrued by libertarian economists and corporate capitalists. According to 
this line of thinking, the distortion lies in the fact that Smith’s theoretical 
assumptions of market economics are not the same as free-market ideology, and 
that his economic theory specifies a number of basic conditions needed for a 
market to set prices efficiently in the public interest. The greater the deviation 
from these public- and morality-oriented conditions, the less socially efficient 
the market system becomes. For Smith, any form of economic concentration 
would weaken the market’s natural ability to establish a price mechanism, to 
produce a satisfactory outcome for market interactions as well as to fairly 
distribute resources. It is important for society to have basic controls against 
such an evolution which would be detrimental to the functioning of society: 
“Those exertions of the natural liberty of a few individuals, which might 
endanger the security of the whole society, are, and ought to be, restrained by 
the laws of all governments” (Smith [1776] 1937: 324). 
 
Even though a case can be made that classical economics in its Smithian version 
showed more social compassion than present-day neoliberalism, the concern for 
the consequences of emerging industrial capitalism was given little attention by 
the classics. By leaving out of the analysis of the violent process of separating 
people from their means of existence, known as primitive accumulation, 
classical economics gave capitalism the needed legitimacy in the confrontation 
with the medieval Christian paternalistic ethic, which had condemned greed, 
acquisitive behavior and the urge to accumulate wealth (Perelman 2000; Hunt 
and Sherman 1981: 30). 
 
In the current era of globalization, the rise and dominance of corporate 
capitalism resulting in concentration of wealth (Anderson and Cavanagh, 2000), 
increasing inequalities, and global environmental crises indicates that the gap 
between moral ethics and economics is enlarging. A remarkable mismatch can 
be observed between on the one hand modern economics’ emphasis on 
competition, productivity, efficiency, free market and on the other hand moral, 
religious and ethical frameworks of social justice, collective values as well as 
human development. The market does not generate and accumulate “moral 
capitals”; on the contrary, it depletes society of them. It reduces people to 
servants of the economy rather than having the economy serve the people. The 
nature of economics in the eyes of Amartya Sen “has been substantially 
impoverished by the distance that has grown between economics and ethics” 
(1987: 7).  
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The evolution of market capitalism can been seen as having gone through a 
number of deformation stages: 1) from cultural and religious reformation to a 
modified form of moral and ethical system that is detached from the original 
moral ethics; 2) from “society with market” (moral economics) to “market 
society” (value-free economics); 3) from theological and spiritual salvation (faith 
in God) to a misguided type of secularism (faith in the market). Such an 
evolution is not an unanticipated process; rather, it can be identified as 
embedded within the political economy of capitalism. 
 
When the effect of the deformed transformation reaches its highest level, a new 
type of belief system emerges – the religion of market capitalism with the 
market as the deity that implicitly promises to alleviate global sufferings through 
economic development. The key difference between the old religion and the new 
one is that the former adhered to values defined and observed by the Church, i.e. 
human beings as moral and ontological creatures; whereas in the latter, people 
become commodities and consumers interacting in the value-free market, i.e. 
humans as tradable things and objects. Ironically, rational reason, which broke 
the theological myth and helped capitalism flourish, is elevated to a holy faith in 
capitalism, demanding complete obedience and disregard of other 
interpretations. This new secular religion is coined by Thomas Frank as “market 
populism” (2000).  
 
The central theme II: an anticipated war of political struggles 
The case can be made that the main distinguishing characteristic of the 20th 
century has been the endless struggles between people and nations whose 
devotion to ideological paradigms or systems of political ideas was regarded as 
unacceptable to others. Political concepts, such as socialism, democracy, 
conservatism, neoliberalism, realism, globalism and so forth involved political, 
economic, and psychological struggles for universal acceptance.  
 
Since the 1920s when capitalism suffered the Great Depression and during the 
crises in the 1970s, supporters of the capitalist system were on the defensive. 
This was partly due to the contrast of the rapid economic growth of the Soviet 
Union until the 1970s as well as its military and technological expansion. The 
impressive performance displayed by the economy of USSR aroused fears in 
Western political classes that the socialist development model might attain 
ideological significance in the non-socialist world. In addition, the Chinese 
development strategy based on self-reliance was likewise recognized as another 
potential rising force. In the prevailing mood of the time, neoliberalism, which 
considered socialist and nationalist movements as anti-systemic to the capitalist 
world system, occupied little space in the mainstream intellectual frame. The so-
called anti-systemic forces included the socialist countries, the national 
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liberation movements, and the coming to power of social-democratic and labor 
parties in the Western world. It was fashionable at the time for governments of 
capitalist countries to identify themselves as either Keynesian or Social 
Democratic. 
 
The transformation of ideological hegemony from proto-socialist and pro-labor 
systems of welfare states to individualistic capitalism, under the current impact 
of global capitalism was not an automatic process. It entailed decades-long 
ideological and political struggles between contending forces. Adherents of 
neoliberalism realized as early as the immediate post-World War II period that 
in order to fundamentally transform political, economic and social ideologies 
they had to prepare for time-consuming and gradual changes of intellectual and 
psychological convictions. With the end of the Cold War neoliberalism is 
claimed by its adherents to be the only legitimate system of ideas. But this was 
not the outcome of a process left to chance. The inherent shortcomings of state 
socialism as well as the financial and economic difficulties of the welfare states 
together with the debt crisis in the Third World were encouraging signals for the 
offensive of neoliberalism. But its victory is the result of a half-century’s 
ideological efforts to penetrate the realms of politics, economics and various 
international organizations. The alliance of financially strong interest groups 
with academics and intellectuals nurtured in American think tanks was able to 
transform the agenda within economic and political thinking and decision-
making in the course of decades (George, 1997).  
 
While accusing the socialist experiments of totalitarianism and ideological 
indoctrination, neoliberalists have taken the proposition for granted that ideas 
must penetrate into people’s mind through all possible means, i.e. education, 
press, media, and international institutions. This strategy recognizes that the 
force of ideology behind social transformation since human beings are not born 
with neoliberal thinking. In order for certain ideas to receive greater attention 
and publicity, they must be promoted through financial support so as to build a 
strong intellectual superstructure. The goal of building such a framework is to 
nurture a liberal worldview: the conceptualization of capitalism as an 
indispensable condition for political liberty. A solid intellectual infrastructure of 
neoliberal ideas corresponds to what Gramsci (1971) considered to be part of 
capitalism’s “hegemonic project,” that is the power and ability to define, sustain, 
and control ideas in order to “get into people’s heads and …acquire their hearts, 
their hands and their destinies” (George op.cit.: 51). 
 
The Fall of the Berlin Wall was perhaps the “greatest victory” for partisans of 
neoliberalism who believe in the slogan - Ideas Have Consequences, the 1948-
book by one of the American founding fathers of neoliberalism, Richard 
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Weaver. Likewise, Thatcherism and Reaganism, as the political protagonists of 
neoliberalism, can be seen as having proved that ideas like actions do have 
consequences in a specific context of neutralizing counter-movements. One of 
the on-going outcomes is the trend toward the formation of an ideal-type 
neoliberal world that we are witnessing today: the globalization of the world 
market, technology, finance, and culture. Rapid integration and uniformity that 
bind the world together through fast food, pop music, high-tech computers are 
pressing nations into a commercially homogenous global structure. In every part 
of the world, national identities and sovereignties are eroding giving rise to 
global entities – multinational companies and transnational banks. The 
ideological compulsion to create an international market, which in turn requires 
a common belief, common language, common policies, and common currency, 
is at the same time creating a global cosmopolitan city-life style based on one 
commonality – American Express and Visa Card. 
 
When the claim is made that we have entered a new era of globalization featured 
by “information technology” and “free market,” these catchy terms are not just 
language reflections of reality, but represent the strong ideological bias of 
liberalism which has been carefully nurtured by those who stand to gain from its 
rule. The collapse of the European and Asian communist systems has led liberal 
politicians, economists and journalists to display a zero-sum game logic in the 
analysis of the ideological dichotomy: if communism does not work, then it 
must be replaced by capitalism; if socialist planned economies fail, then liberal 
free-market economies must be universally accepted. These simple binary 
oppositions in which Communism is contrasted to free market, authoritarianism 
to democracy, dictatorship to freedom have become “universal criteria” of world 
politics and economics. However, given the absence of any viable social 
alternative, the hidden nature of market economics will from now on be 
analyzed and assessed on the basis of its own merits/demerits. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have attempted to offer a framework for understanding the 
birth and expansion of capitalism, which has a different analytical focus than the 
mono-causal explanation that rely on culture, technology and economics. In our 
view, the shortcoming of these approaches is that their explanations are basically 
constructed around the proposition that the origin and development of capitalism 
is an fortuitous consequence of an aggregation of series of mutually-supportive 
activities. Viewed from this optic, capitalism emerged within a specific socio-
cultural setting and developed out of a long process of competitive activities of 
merchants and manufacturers in the rational pursuit of their individual economic 
self-interest, which evolved in the development of new production relations and 
eroded the existing structure of society. However, although acknowledging its 
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significance, we reject this conventional wisdom and emphasize what is usually 
not debated – the political essence and content behind the “evolution” of 
capitalism. To paraphrase Karl Marx, if the appearance of a phenomenon 
revealed its essence, there would be no need for scientific inquiry. 
 
The entire history of capitalism is one of a forced process of inclusiveness and 
exclusiveness. Its starting point was the imposition of a ruthless coercion on 
common people through the compulsory enclosure and enforced formation of 
new property relations and legal system. With the restrictive access to land 
accompanying industrial transformation began a new form of production 
relations based on primitive capitalist accumulation. Simultaneously, Europe’s 
expansion overseas, which began with conquest and trading relationships, 
resulted in the extension of the capitalist system of production. Through the 
slave trade, colonialization, “free trade”, world wars, foreign aids, structural 
adjustment, etc., the division of world resources and international division of 
labor was imposed and extended by military and political means. Aspects in the 
history of capitalism, which are outside the purview of conventional economics 
as well as the culturalist analysis. 
 
The same process is still at work in many parts of the world.  In developing 
countries many peasants are being press-ganged into factories as capitalism is 
forcibly imposed on them. The transition of non-capitalist society into market 
capitalism is not the choice by the people nor is generated by the market 
necessities, rather, it is implemented by the elites of these countries with the 
support and encouragement of global capitalist forces and installations and on 
the basis of their political and economic interests. China’s societal development 
in the past decades in a case in point. 
 
It is no exaggeration to conclude that in historical retrospect and in the 
predictable future following the consequence of the radicalization and 
universalization of market capitalism, major issues concerning human society, 
such as development, globalization, North-South, inequality, poverty, security, 
welfare, trade, terrorism, war, etc., are and will be bounded within political 
foundations. Under these circumstances, politics is the most important arena 
where solutions of societal contradictions as well as sources of human struggles 
are to be found. 
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Notes 
 
1 In Kuhn’s explanation paradigms are social and intellectual constructs, system of 
explanations and interpretations by which natural scientists/social scientists attempt to make 
sense of the real world. When the old paradigm begins to be confronted by anomalies, a new 
paradigm starts to emerge and struggles to consider and interpret the same evidence in a new 
light, thus opening novel avenues for accumulating additional knowledge. 
 
2 Within the Western Christian religion there was a long struggle between the Protestant 
Reformation and the Catholic Counter-Reformation in pre-modern Europe where the leading 
powers were divided along religious lines: Catholic, Protestant, Eastern Orthodox and 
Muslim. The Wars of Religion (1618-1648) ended with the Peace of Westphalia. Among 
these powers, the Protestant (first England and the Netherlands and later the United States) 
had distinctive secular characters, which were analyzed by Max Weber who in The Protestant 
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism developed a culturalist explanation as to why capitalism 
originated in the Protestant part of Europe. 
 
3 A religious movement in 16th-century Europe that took place as an attempt to reform the 
Roman Catholic Church and ended with the establishment of independent Protestant 
Churches. 
 
4 In Weber’s understanding, the spirit of capitalism in the West became a moral and ethical 
system stressing economic success, whereas, material greed and profit-making were viewed 
as ethically immoral in many non-Western cultures as well as pre-protestant Europe. 
 
5 It should not be forgotten that in order for capitalism to flourish in North America and 
Australia, forced population transfers of the destitute from Europe took place in order to 
colonize these areas, thus giving these entrepreneurs the needed labour power for their 
economic activities while releasing population pressures in the metropole. 
 
6 Friedrich Hegel, in comparing Western consciousness with that of the rest of the world 
which created revolutionary history, placed China in the “childhood” phase of history; and 
Karl Marx, whose theories and insights inspired the Chinese Revolution, described China in 
some articles for the New York Herald Tribune as a society “vegetating in the teeth of time”, 
and characterized the Great Wall of China as a metaphor for the universal resistance of non-
European societies to change. See Dirlik and Meisner (1989:17).  
 
7 Equilibrium refers to an ideal market-price situation in which the interactions of economic 
agents are mutually consistent. Taking commodity price for example, equilibrium of price is 
shaped by a mutual affecting process in which suppliers increase prices when demand is in 
excess and decrease them when supply is in excess - the mechanism regulates the forces of 
supply and demand. See Begg, David, et. al (2000:30-32). 
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